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Chapter pages in book: (p. 62 - 64)hygiene in some working class households suggests to some extent that the
working class housewife is overburdened with work already at hand, and
would find it impossible to take up part-time work in addition." Op.cit.,
p. 184.
The ready replacement of men mobilized early may lead to false
expectations about later civilian employment. When single and
childless men enter the armed forces, many childless housewives go
into industry. By the time fathers are inducted, the remaining men
and young unmarried women in most families are working in war
industry many hours overtime. Consequently, a great deal of work
ordinarily shared with other members of the family has to be done
entirely by the housewife—mending, pressing, laundering, shopping,
gardening, and caring for children. An added burden falls upon
all housewives when labor is shifted from jobs normally performed
for the home to essential jobs, for every full-time gainful worker
diverted from service for the home to war occupations leaves a
full-time job (or more than one) whose doing must be shared among
housewives. The latter must choose between performing the jobs
themselves and skimping on the living standard of their families. To
some extent economizing is the proper alternative. It will not neces-
sarily be accepted for that reason, however, and in many cases, it
would sap the efficiency of those in the labor force. Above a certain
stage, intensive war mobilization within the labor force itself tends
to strengthen resistance to further entries of housewives not already
working gainfully.
10 THE LABOR FORCE AFTER THIS WAR
Ifthe apparent rise in the American labor force propensity during
World War I was illusory, the events that followed cannot indicate
what we may expect after this war.• Signs. do exist, however, that the
additions during this war will not remain in the labor force when
peace comes.
Nearly half of the wartime additions have been persons of school
age, 14-24. It seems sure that our school attendance after this war
will resume its historic upward trend. Indeed, a large portion of the
young persons who came into the total labor force were simply
students who entered the armed forces and they will doubtless wish
to take up education where they left off, in many cases at the high
school level. Several factors may join to swell the postwar per-
centage in school relative to the prewar; e.g., the spread of economic
well-being, the urbanization of the population, the widening govern-
t62)ment subsidy of higher education and of elementary and high school
education in poor areas, the extending Americanization as the for-
eign born die off, and this nation's widening cultural awareness. If
these factors operate as suggested, the consequent decline in the
percentages of young people in the labor force will hardly be cush-
ioned by the sharp rise in employability standards and the re-intensi-
fied opposition of unions to child labor.
Another fourth of the war additions have been women over 24
who came into the labor force as males left. Several reasons suggest
that women newcomers will go out as men are discharged. A minor
factor will be that the patriotic urge to help in the war will give way
to the patriotic urge to vacate a job for a service man. More impor-
tant, employability standards will rise sharply and wage inducements
will fall off. Most important, a big percentage of women will not
work if their men can support them, as may easily be learned by ask-
ing a few working women; and the necessity of many women will
be relieved by the return of the men to civilian jobs, assuming of
course, that war deaths and other permanent war casualties are not
numerous. Nearly as important perhaps, the absence of male com-
panionship has doubtless led many women to take jobs: when normal
social life is restored, they will quit. According to a Gallup Poll,
half of all married women and a seventh of all single women in war
jobs plan to stop working after the war.73
Most of the other accretions to the labor force during the war have
been persons over 54. Though there is less reason for assuming their
withdrawal, some will leave the labor force because of higher em-
ployability standards or lower 'wage rates.
For the later postwar period up to, say, 1950, indications are about
the same. No change from 1940maybe expected in the age and sex
composition of the population that would affect the size of the labor
force, and the expected trends in labor force propensities of different
groups promise largely to cancel out.The labor force propensity of the
young will undoubtedly decline somewhat, for reasons already dis-
cussed. That of mature women will probably rise, but only slightly;
for the net birth rate will probably not fall below prewar levels,
and the larger incomes and widening social security of primary work-
ers, will, by reducing pressure on wives and daughters to earn, tend to
countervail any multiplication of job opportunities for women. The
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{ 63 Jlabor forcepropensity of old persons is not likely to go below prewar
levels. Declines for this group were due in the past tothewidening
of social security (Sec.5),but the extension of old age insurance in
the postwar period cannot, so far as the number covered is. concerned,
do more than take the place of charity in the prewar.
All in all, a peacetime return to prewar labor force propensities is
foreseeable, provided permanent casualties are not extreme. The labor
force, therefore, is likely to be larger than before this war only in
proportion to the population growth. Our prospective problem is to
find jobs in peacetime industry for those members of the normal labor
force who are in the service or in civilian jobs that end with the war.
Even if the wartime additions to the labor force do withdraw,
their jobs cannot all be turned over to the returning soldiers, because
a great many of these jobs also will evaporate with the war. Many
jobs, however, that have temporarily been filled by civilian new-
comers, will be restored to the primary wage earners and many of
the persons withdrawing from the total labor force will be service
men themselves who leave to go back to school. The withdrawals
that do occur, moreover, will relieve the pressure for jobs at a very
crucial time. As the standards of employability rise again, the per-
centage of unemployables among these wartime additions, consider-
ing who they are, would surely become quite big and the exodus from
the labor force will avert a considerable part of the unemployment
certain to occur even in the face of a strong demand for labor.
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion of this paper is that the possibilities of net
additions to the normal labor force in wartime have been exaggerated.
When from a tenth to a third of the normal labor force goes into
the military services the civilian labor force apparently suffers a
net loss. If American, British, and German peacetime experience is
typical, the labor force is not very sensitive to economic shocks; and
differences in labor force propensities among nations are accounted
for in large part by traditional differences in social structures, and
do not reflect disparities in national management.
The wartime evidence supports five conclusions. First, most of
the supposed additions to the normal labor force in World War I
were illusory. Perhaps in none of the three countries was. the illusion
greater than in the United States.
Second, in this war some real net increases in the total labor force
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